United Nations S/2014/663

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 September 2014

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Letter dated 11 September 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit a note verbale dated 12 August 2014 from the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) BAN Ki-moon

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Annex

[Original: French]

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Secretariat and has the honour to inform it of the following: pursuant to paragraph 50 of Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), the Permanent Mission of France transmits herewith the third report on the operational activities of the French force Sangaris deployed in the Central African Republic.

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations would be grateful if the Secretariat would bring this report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations takes this opportunity to convey to the United Nations Secretariat the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

Enclosure

[Original: French]

Third report on Operation Sangaris

Support to the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic in the discharge of its mandate

Period from 25 May to 25 July 2014

Basis of the support to the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA)

- Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) of 5 December 2013 authorizes the French forces in the Central African Republic, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, and for a temporary period, to take all necessary measures to support MISCA in the discharge of its mandate.

Generic actions undertaken by the Sangaris force

- In the implementation of confidence-building measures, since 9 December 2013, the Sangaris force has been supporting MISCA by implementing and overseeing measures for the disarming and barracking of armed groups in its areas of deployment.
- MISCA and Operation Sangaris have contributed to the barracking of the ex-Seleka at several sites in Bangui and have participated in the disarming of the anti-balaka in Bangui in the centre and in western Central African Republic. Since December, they have also seized nearly 1,400 military weapons and large quantities of ammunition in the process of disarming ex-Seleka and anti-balaka elements in an impartial manner.
- These actions have been carried out jointly in Bangui and the western and eastern parts of the country in order to extend the area control actions. During these missions, the Sangaris force intervened to prevent or put an end to any abuses it witnessed, in particular by firing warning shots.
- The Sangaris force also supports MISCA in protecting the people on a daily basis, not only in Bangui but also in the provinces, in particular in Boda, Bouar, Yaloke, Bossangoa, Sibut, Grimari, Bambari and Bria, where the French forces acting jointly with MISCA have prevented abuses and sometimes used force to put an end to them. The operation carried out from 5 to 15 June in conjunction with the Gabonese MISCA contingent in the central town of Dekoa enabled the inhabitants who had fled into the bush several months earlier to return to their village. The operation also led to the reinstatement of the sous-préfet of Dekoa on 1 July.

  Similarly, the operation carried out from 10 to 13 July in conjunction with the Cameroonian MISCA contingent in the north-western regions of Nana Bakassa and Batangafo put an end to abuses committed by certain recalcitrant armed groups.

- The joint Sangaris-MISCA action played a major part in the resumption of vehicle traffic on the main east-west road between Bangui and Garoua Boulaï on the border with Cameroon. The many convoy escorts (on average two provided by MISCA and one by Sangaris every week) have sustained trade flows to Bangui and enabled the capital to be resupplied on an ongoing basis. The joint mission is creating a virtuous circle which is contributing to the current economic recovery.
- Access to humanitarian assistance is also being facilitated by the ongoing joint action by the Sangaris force and MISCA in the areas where they are deployed together, especially in the east of the country.

Substantive support provided to MISCA

- Seven French officers have been integrated into MISCA headquarters on an ongoing basis; one gendarmerie officer is an adviser to the Commander of the police component; one officer is an adviser to the MISCA Force Commander.
- In Bangui, two tactical liaison detachments provided by the Acier combined arms battle group (the French battalion assigned to the city) coordinate joint missions with the Burundian and Rwandan battalions of MISCA.
- On a daily basis, support to MISCA also takes the form of advising on the restructuring of units, the organization of command and planning for operations. Military intelligence is shared between the leaderships of the two forces. The planning cells of the general staff of the two forces meet on a weekly basis. A meeting is also held every week to coordinate operations in Bangui.
- The French and MISCA force commanders interact in a unified manner with the Transitional Authorities and the main actors on a regular basis to coordinate their joint actions. The general staff of the two forces meet every week for that purpose.
- Patrols and operations are planned and conducted jointly on a regular basis in Bangui and in outlying regions. While concentrating on the main supply road leading to the capital and on certain districts in Bangui, these joint missions are normally carried out wherever Sangaris is deployed. Over 260 joint patrols have been carried out in the last two months.
- In the area of logistics, France has helped to make MISCA more mobile: 54 French vehicles are held by MISCA, and support continues to be provided for them from M'poko.
- France has also supported MISCA deployment to outlying regions, which is currently 90 per cent complete. The withdrawal of the Chadian contingent in early April, however, delayed that deployment: the African Union force had to urgently fill the security vacuum left behind by postponing its deployment to the eastern provinces of the Central African Republic.
- In terms of medical support, the Sangaris force conducted three surgeries and provided paramedical assistance in 30 cases for MISCA in the last two months. Two patients were medically evacuated by force helicopters.

- France participated in unloading four Antonov 124 aircraft for the United Nations and provided inter- and intra-theatre air transportation for more than 600 African soldiers.

Sangaris activities to assist the internal security forces

- Pursuant to the French forces' mandate, contained in paragraphs 28 (v) and 50 of Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), concerning their contribution to "national and international efforts to reform and restructure the defence and security sectors", Sangaris activities have taken the form of joint patrols by Sangaris and internal security forces in the fifth district of Bangui and support for the deployment of internal security forces in the provinces (main supply road and Bambari).

- Pursuant to paragraph 54 (e) of resolution 2127 (2013), France requested the sanctions committee's prior authorization for the French Operation Sangaris forces to provide the Central African internal security forces with a limited number of weapons from the stocks seized by Sangaris during disarmament operations as part of its operations to support MISCA. With the agreement of the sanctions committee, the weapons were transferred.

  A second request for an authorization covering 31 weapons is currently under consideration under a no-objection procedure.

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Security Council

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15 September 2014

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Chad, France, Nigeria, Rwanda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Liberia, in particular resolutions 1509 (2003), 2066 (2012) and 2116 (2013), and its press statement of 9 July 2014,

Expressing grave concern about the extent of the outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa, in particular in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone,

Affirming that the Government of Liberia bears primary responsibility for ensuring peace, stability and the protection of the civilian population in Liberia and *stressing* that lasting stability in Liberia will require the Government of Liberia to sustain well-functioning and accountable government institutions, particularly of the rule of law and security sectors,

Welcoming the launch of the Liberia Operational Plan for Accelerated Response to Recurrence of Ebola Epidemic, *taking note* of the efforts of the national security forces, notably the Liberia National Police and the Armed Forces of Liberia, to respond promptly to the outbreak through undertaking public awareness and prevention activities in conformity with established safety protocols and procedures and *urging* the national security forces, when responding to security incidents, to use proportionate force,

Welcoming the convening of the Mano River Union Extraordinary Summit, held in Guinea on 1 August 2014, and the commitments expressed by the Heads of State of Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and the Head of the World Health Organization to combat the Ebola outbreak in the region, including by strengthening treatment services and measures to isolate the outbreak across borders and *also welcoming* the commitment of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, as well as bilateral partners and multilateral organizations, to support efforts to combat the further spread of the Ebola virus,

Expressing appreciation for the appointments by the Secretary-General of David Nabarro as the United Nations System Senior Coordinator for Ebola Virus Disease and of Anthony Banbury as the Deputy Ebola Coordinator and Operation Crisis Manager operating from the United Nations Operations Crisis Centre, in order to assist governments in the region to address the Ebola outbreak,

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Urging the international community to respond swiftly to the shortage of qualified medical professionals and appropriate equipment and preventive measures necessary to address the Ebola outbreak in West Africa,

Expressing deep appreciation for and *commending* the continued contribution and commitment of United Nations personnel, especially the Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), to assist in consolidating peace and stability in Liberia, and the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,

Noting the possible delays in the conduct of the Special Senatorial Election scheduled for October 2014,

Taking note of the report dated 15 August 2014 of the Secretary-General (S/2014/598) and *also taking note* of the letter dated 28 August 2014 of the Secretary-General (S/2014/644) and his recommendation to defer consideration of the proposals outlined in his 15 August 2014 report (S/2014/598) for the extension of the mandate of UNMIL,

Determining that the situation in Liberia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNMIL until 31 December 2014;

2. *Endorses* the Secretary-General's recommendation in his letter dated 28 August 2014 (S/2014/644) to defer consideration of the proposals in his report (S/2014/598) of 15 August 2014 on adjustments to the mandate of UNMIL;

3. *Expresses its intention* to further extend the mandate of UNMIL to 30 September 2015 after consideration of the Secretary-General's proposals;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep it updated on the situation in Liberia by no later than 15 November 2014;

5. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



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Security Council

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12 September 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 29 May to 3 September 2014

I. Introduction

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the past three months, pursuant to the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and extended by subsequent resolutions, most recently through resolution 2163 (2014).

II. Situation in the area and activities of the Force

2. At the time of writing, the situation in the UNDOF area of operation is evolving rapidly and remains volatile, with heavy fighting continuing between the Syrian armed forces and the armed members of the opposition and other armed groups in the area of separation. Several UNDOF peacekeepers serving with the Fijian battalion were detained by armed elements. At the present time, no additional information on their status or location has been established.*

3. During the reporting period, the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic generally was maintained, albeit in a continuously volatile environment attributable to the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and despite a number of significant violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement by Israeli and Syrian forces, signed in 1974, set out below. Several incidents of firing across the ceasefire line occurred, resulting in casualties. Of particular note, on 22 June, fire from the Bravo side killed a civilian and injured others on the Alpha side and, in retaliation, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fired into the area of separation and limitation on the Bravo side, resulting in the death and injury of Syrian armed forces personnel. The Syrian armed forces significantly increased the number of personnel and equipment deployed inside the area of separation and carried out military activities and security operations against armed members of the opposition, at times in response to offensives carried out by the armed members of the opposition. Inside the area of separation, the presence of the Syrian armed forces and military equipment, as well as any other armed personnel and military

* As the present report was going to press, the 45 UNDOF peacekeepers were released unharmed on 11 September. They were brought to position 80, from where they crossed to the Alpha side. Subsequently, the peacekeepers returned to the Bravo side and Camp Faouar.

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equipment, is in violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. As underscored by the Security Council in its resolution 2163 (2014), there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation.

4. On the morning of 27 August, approximately 100 armed members of several armed groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, launched an attack on Syrian armed forces positions at the Bravo gate and in the area of Quneitra in the area of separation. UNDOF evacuated its personnel from the Charlie gate to Camp Ziouani. Later that day, UNDOF observed armed elements removing three United Nations vehicles left behind at the position, as well as looting equipment and personal effects at the position. Simultaneous to the attack on Quneitra and the Bravo gate, armed groups also engaged Syrian armed forces positions in the area of Tal al-Kurum and Jaba. There were several incidents when fire, including mortar rounds, landed close to United Nations positions, as a result of which United Nations personnel in positions affected by the fighting, as well as those in Camp Ziouani, entered shelters. Following several hours of heavy fighting, the armed elements gained control of the Bravo gate and most parts of Quneitra.

5. On the afternoon of 27 August, eight armed fighters forcibly entered position 27 while UNDOF personnel were in the shelter. The armed elements demanded that the United Nations personnel vacate the position in order to avoid injury in the ongoing fighting. The UNDOF personnel refused and remained in the shelter while fighting in Quneitra continued. The Force Commander spoke to the leader of the armed fighters and requested that the armed elements vacate the position and not harm the United Nations peacekeepers. The armed fighters remained inside the United Nations premises, however, and continued their attack on the Syrian armed forces through the night, including from within position 27. A small group of armed elements ransacked the position and took United Nations and personal items from it. They also put on United Nations uniforms and blue berets taken from the accommodations of the personnel.

6. As a result of fire landing inside position 60, two buildings caught fire. Owing to the continuing fighting in the area, United Nations personnel had to remain in the shelter and could not extinguish the fire. The fire completely destroyed both buildings.

7. In the course of the fighting on 27 August, one IDF soldier and one Israeli civilian were injured on the Alpha side by fire that landed across the ceasefire line. IDF subsequently responded by firing on a Syrian armed forces position, approximately 3 km from Camp Faouar on the Bravo side. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate informed UNDOF that one artillery weapon was destroyed.

8. On the morning of 28 August, the armed fighters, who had remained at position 27 overnight, demanded that the UNDOF personnel leave the position, leaving behind their vehicles. They said that UNDOF personnel would be moved in vehicles of the armed fighters towards the Alpha gate. Approximately 300 armed elements were seen outside the perimeter of the position. UNDOF readied the Force Reserve for possible relocation of the United Nations personnel; however, the position personnel were given a 10-minute deadline by the armed elements to move out. The Force Commander therefore gave orders for the United Nations personnel to vacate the position. The armed fighters took the weapons of the UNDOF personnel and then transported the UNDOF personnel to the area of the Bravo gate on the understanding that they would be allowed to cross to the Alpha side.

However, a representative of the armed elements near the Alpha gate on the Bravo side, who said that he was waiting for the arrival of the detained peacekeepers, subsequently informed UNDOF that they had been taken elsewhere. UNDOF then observed vehicles resembling those of the armed elements that had been present at position 27 moving in the direction of position 60, but lost sight of them.

9. Armed elements subsequently moved to United Nations positions 68 in Ruihinah and 69 in Braika, with at least two Fijian peacekeepers, and demanded that United Nations personnel at the two positions give up their weapons in order for the 45 detained UNDOF peacekeepers to be released. When the United Nations personnel did not hand over their weapons, the armed members placed command-detonated explosive devices around the two positions to prevent the United Nations personnel from leaving, and threatened to attack the positions. As a precautionary measure, to prevent more United Nations positions and personnel from coming under siege, UNDOF evacuated its personnel from positions 80 to 85 and subsequently to the Alpha side. On the evening of 28 August, armed elements attempted to force their way through the gate of position 69. United Nations personnel fired warning shots and the armed elements withdrew.

10. Heavy fighting between the Syrian armed forces and armed elements continued on 29 August in the central part of the area of separation. Following some rounds falling close to position 60, UNDOF evacuated the position. In the early morning of 30 August, armed elements detonated at least one explosive they had placed outside the gate of position 68 and began attacking the position. United Nations personnel at the position fired in return. The exchange of fire lasted for several hours, at which point UNDOF managed to establish an agreement with the armed elements on a ceasefire lasting until the next day. No injuries were incurred among the United Nations personnel during the exchange of fire. The situation at position 69 was relatively quiet that morning and UNDOF was able to evacuate the personnel to the Alpha side. At midday, after firing took place in the vicinity of observation post 52, the Observer Group Golan military observers, and UNDOF personnel who had been placed at the observation post to provide additional security, also were evacuated.

11. On the evening of 30 August, UNDOF observed between 100 and 120 armed elements arrive in the vicinity of Ruihinah from areas farther south. As a precautionary measure, the UNDOF evacuated its personnel from observation post 56. During the night, United Nations personnel from position 68 left the position on foot and moved across the technical fence to the Alpha side. UNDOF maintains a reinforced presence at United Nations position 80 near al-Rafid.

12. Since the fierce fighting that commenced on 27 August, which led to the detention of the UNDOF peacekeepers from the Fijian contingent and the siege of two UNDOF positions, the UNDOF Force Commander has been in regular close contact with the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate and IDF. Both parties provided full support to UNDOF in ensuring the safe evacuation of its peacekeepers from positions that had to be vacated as a result of the ongoing fighting. The UNDOF Force Commander as well as Secretariat staff have been in ongoing contact with Member States that may have influence over the armed groups in order to effect the immediate, unconditional and safe release of the members of the Fijian contingent.

13. In the context of the clashes between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition and other armed groups, there were multiple incidents of

firing from the Bravo side across the ceasefire line and several incidents of fire from the Alpha side to the Bravo side. On the morning of 2 June, four rockets were fired from the vicinity of Camp Faouar in a north-northwestern direction. Two vehicles with mounted multiple-launch rocket systems were seen speeding away from the firing location. Shortly thereafter, IDF informed UNDOF that they had detected a threat near Camp Faouar and that IDF would retaliate. UNDOF personnel immediately took shelter. The first artillery round fired by IDF landed within a distance of 100 m of Camp Faouar as the shelter alarm was sounded and United Nations personnel were still rushing to the shelters. Another three rounds landed within 1 km of the camp. IDF subsequently informed UNDOF that one rocket had impacted west of the ceasefire line, in proximity to one of its positions. A significant amount of shrapnel and debris fell into Camp Faouar. There was no injury to United Nations personnel, but slight damage to United Nations property. The UNDOF leadership was in immediate contact with both parties to prevent an escalation of the situation. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate informed UNDOF that the Syrian armed forces were not involved in the incident and stated that armed elements might have infiltrated the area overnight to fire against the pro-Government village of Hadar and instil fear among the population ahead of the presidential elections scheduled for 3 June. IDF informed UNDOF that it had retaliated because it had assessed that Israel was being targeted. UNDOF carried out an investigation into the incident, which showed that the rockets that landed in the area of Hadar and the one that landed on the Alpha side were of the same calibre and type, and most likely originated from the same weapon. UNDOF protested to both parties the firing of rockets across the ceasefire line in violation of the Disengagement Agreement. UNDOF also expressed grave concern to IDF about the firing close to Camp Faouar, which placed United Nations personnel in serious danger.

14. On 22 June, United Nations personnel observed an explosion in the vicinity of observation post 52 that hit a vehicle on the IDF patrol path west of the technical fence. One Israeli teenager was killed and four other people were wounded. IDF retaliated with several tank rounds onto Syrian armed forces positions in Quneitra, in the area of separation, in close proximity to United Nations position 27. IDF informed UNDOF of the retaliation after the fact and suggested that United Nations personnel deployed between Ufaniyah in the north and Bir Ajam in the south go into shelters. United Nations personnel remained in shelters until IDF notified UNDOF that no further firing would take place that day, but cautioned UNDOF to minimize movement in the area of separation. Shortly after midnight on 23 June, IDF conducted an airstrike on nine locations on the Bravo side, dropping several bombs in the general area of Camp Faouar. United Nations personnel in the camp went into shelter. The UNDOF investigation into the 22 June firing indicated that a missile had been fired from the general area east of Ruihinah across the ceasefire line. The Syrian authorities informed UNDOF that four Syrian armed forces personnel were killed and nine more were wounded by IDF retaliatory fire. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate maintained that the missile that killed the teenager on 22 June was not fired by the Syrian armed forces. The UNDOF investigation further showed that the IDF response fire on 23 June came closest to Camp Faouar when it targeted two Syrian armed forces positions, located approximately 2 km from the camp.

15. On 5 June, IDF informed UNDOF that three mortars were fired on the Bravo side and landed on the Alpha side following the announcement of the results of the presidential election. On 15 June, IDF informed UNDOF that a rocket had landed on

the Alpha side, in the vicinity of Majdal Shams. The UNDOF investigation confirmed that a rocket had been fired to the Alpha side from the Bravo side. On 7 July, UNDOF heard three explosions in the vicinity of Masada on the Alpha side. IDF responded with five rounds of fire in the vicinity of Bayt Jinn in the area of limitation on the Bravo side. On 13 July, unidentified elements fired one rocket from a position north of Camp Faouar, which landed across the ceasefire line in a mine field in the vicinity of United Nations outpost 37B. IDF retaliated with five missiles into the area of limitation on the Bravo side, hitting one Syrian armed forces position located 3 km south of Camp Faouar. According to the Syrian authorities, one Syrian armed forces soldier was killed and two others were wounded. Shortly after the launch of the rocket from the Bravo side, the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate had informed UNDOF of a rocket having been fired by armed elements from north of UNDOF headquarters in the direction of Hadar village. On 14 July, unidentified elements fired two rockets from the same location north of Camp Faouar, which impacted on the outskirts of El Rom village on the Alpha side. IDF fired two artillery rounds at a location 2 km east of Camp Faouar in the area of limitation. IDF had informed UNDOF prior to the retaliatory fire and UNDOF personnel at Camp Faouar went into shelters. On 20 July, the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate informed UNDOF that a shell had been fired by armed elements towards the Alpha side. IDF subsequently confirmed that a round had landed approximately 3 km west of Majdal Shams. United Nations personnel on the ground did not observe the firing. IDF did not retaliate. On 23 July, a tank round landed on the Alpha side close to United Nations observation post 51, causing damage to the perimeter fence of the post. On 24 August, unidentified elements fired four rockets from approximately 4 km north of Camp Faouar in the area of limitation on the Bravo side, which landed in Ayn Ziwan on the Alpha side and injured one civilian. On 27 August, one mortar round fired from the Bravo side injured one IDF soldier 2 km from the Alpha line. IDF responded with fire on a Syrian armed forces position approximately 3 km south of Camp Faouar. In addition, there were numerous occasions when small arms and anti-aircraft fire exchanged between the Syrian armed forces and the armed members of the opposition and other armed groups in the area of Quneitra and Al-Qahtaniyah landed on the Alpha side.

16. During the night of 29 July and early on 30 July, United Nations personnel at observation post 51 heard rounds passing close by their post and explosions nearby. UNDOF informed the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate of the firing in the area of observation post 51 and urged him to relay to Syrian armed forces on the ground to stop the firing, as fire had landed on the Alpha side and close to the United Nations observation post. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate confirmed to UNDOF that the Syrian armed forces had fired artillery as part of ongoing clashes with armed elements and that all rounds fired by the Syrian armed forces had landed on the Bravo side. The following morning, one unexploded artillery round was found in proximity to the ceasefire line and the perimeter of United Nations observation post 51. The unexploded ordnance had penetrated the tarmac of the road leading to the observation post, where it remained. The round was a 122 mm dual purpose (anti-armour and anti-personnel) improved conventional ammunition artillery round of a type usually containing around 30 sub-munitions. The UNDOF investigation found that, on the basis of the direction and angle of impact of the projectile in the tarmac, the round was fired from an area that is bounded by Khan Arnabeh in the south-west, Jaba in the south and Camp Faouar in the north.

17. Crossing of the ceasefire line by civilians, primarily shepherds, was observed on an almost daily basis by United Nations personnel on the ground. On 29 May and 29 July, IDF fired warning shots towards shepherds who had crossed the ceasefire line. Throughout the reporting period, UNDOF frequently observed armed members of the opposition interacting with IDF across the ceasefire line in the vicinity of United Nations position 85. UNDOF observed armed members of the opposition transferring 47 wounded persons from the Bravo side across the ceasefire line to IDF, and IDF on the Alpha side handing over 43 treated individuals to the armed members of the opposition on the Bravo side.

18. UNDOF protested all firings across the ceasefire line to the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate and IDF. All incidents of firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line, as well as the crossing by individuals of the ceasefire line, are violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement.

19. In employing its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and see that it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed by the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, UNDOF reports all breaches of the ceasefire line. The Force Commander maintained regular and close contact with IDF and the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate. During periods of heightened tensions, as well as during and in the immediate aftermath of firing incidents across the ceasefire line, the Force Commander was in ongoing close contact with both parties to the Disengagement Agreement to prevent an escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line. He also engaged closely with both sides to find mechanisms, including the exchange of information about civilian activities close to the ceasefire line, that could contribute to preventing future incidents.

20. Throughout the reporting period, the heavy firing and intermittent armed clashes between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition and other armed groups continued in the UNDOF area of operation. In the northern area of limitation, shelling and explosions were observed in the areas of Mazra'at Bayt Jinn and Bayt Jinn, Mughur al-Mir and Baytima, the intensity of which increased significantly at the end of August. The local truce arrangement in the areas of Jabbata, Ufaniyah, Trunje and Khan Arnabah, in the northern and central parts of the area of separation, generally held despite sporadic firing from Syrian armed forces positions in the areas surrounding the villages. Fighting remained most intense in the central and southern parts of the area of separation and in the area of limitation just east of it. The presence and use of heavy weapons and equipment by the Syrian armed forces and, to a somewhat lesser degree, by the armed members of the opposition and other armed groups, continued. The Syrian armed forces carried out airstrikes, mostly in the southern part of the area of limitation around the towns of Nawa and Jaseem, as well as in some areas close to the area of separation, and on one occasion, on 27 July, in the area of separation in the vicinity of al-Rafid village. On 25 August, UNDOF personnel observed Syrian armed forces firing at an unmanned aerial vehicle flying in the vicinity of Jaba in the area of limitation.

21. Early on 31 May, Syrian armed forces launched a counter-attack on Al-Qahtaniyah village in the area of separation, with heavy tank fire and artillery shelling from several of their positions. The village had come under the control of the armed members of the opposition and other armed groups at the beginning of May. Approximately 100 Syrian armed forces soldiers moved in on the village and heavy clashes ensued between the soldiers and other armed groups. The first attack

was combined with a second on the neighbouring village of Al-Samdaniyah. The armed groups repelled the attacks on both villages. Until the 27 August attack by armed groups on the Bravo gate and Quneitra, the two sides continued to exchange fire in the area of Al-Qahtaniyah and Quneitra on a daily basis without significant changes to the military situation on the ground. On 15 July, Syrian armed forces again initiated activities in the area of separation when they deployed on and around Tal al-Kurum and took control of Al-Samdaniyah from the armed members of the opposition.

22. On 9 and 10 July, armed groups carried out a ground offensive against Syrian armed forces positions located at Zbedah al-Sharkia, Nab' as-Sakhr, Kammuniyah and Majdotiyah, in the area of limitation. Armed groups took control of eight Syrian armed forces positions. In the period since the initial attack, the Syrian armed forces have regained control of two of the positions they initially lost, and continue to shell areas that remain in the hands of the armed opposition and other armed groups. At the time of the present report, the two sides remain in a standoff of forces. The armed members of the opposition have enlarged their area of control up to 5 km east of the Bravo line.

23. Concomitantly with these developments, the incidents of firing close to United Nations positions increased. On numerous occasions during periods of fighting between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition and other armed groups, rounds landed inside or in close proximity to United Nations positions, at times forcing United Nations personnel to take shelter. On 15 July, the Syrian armed forces deployed soldiers with tanks and anti-aircraft weapons on Tal al-Kurum, a hill in the area of separation in the immediate vicinity of United Nations observation post 56, in violation of the Disengagement Agreement. The deployment exposed United Nations personnel at observation post 56 to further risk of being caught in the crossfire and resulted in frequent incidents of firing close to and into the observation post. On 22 July, owing to the evolving security situation, UNDOF soldiers temporarily relieved the unarmed military observers of the Observer Group Golan at observation post 56. After their deployment on and around Tal al-Kurum, Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition and other armed groups frequently exchanged fire. Multiple incidents of rounds landing close to the observation post occurred, and forced UNDOF personnel to take shelter. On 8 August, more than 70 mortar rounds landed on Tal al-Kurum, two of which landed inside the premises of the United Nations observation post and others immediately adjacent to the perimeter fence. The rounds damaged a United Nations vehicle and the windows of the observation post, as well as the gate and the two water tanks; water pipes were damaged as a result of firing close to the observation post on 17 July.

24. The UNDOF Force Commander repeatedly protested to the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate, urging the Syrian authorities to remove the Syrian armed forces personnel and their weapons. The Syrian armed forces increased and fortified their presence on and around Tal al-Kurum with more than 100 troops, earth mounds and pre-fabricated shelters to house the troops, and deployed two tanks, two anti-aircraft weapons and three heavy machine guns mounted on vehicles at a distance of 200 to 300 m from the observation post towards the bottom of the hill. UNDOF received several demands from representatives of the armed groups that Syrian armed forces leave the position around the observation post; if they failed to do so, the groups threatened to launch attacks against Syrian armed forces as well as UNDOF at

position 68 and observation post 56. The armed groups subsequently withdrew their threat against UNDOF. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate informed the Force Commander on 19 July that a senior-level Government committee had decided that the Syrian armed forces would be withdrawn from Tal al-Kurum after some time. The Syrian authorities informed the Force Commander that the Syrian armed forces deployment was occasioned by the threat of an attack by armed groups on the towns of Khan Arnabeh and al-Baath in the central part of the UNDOF area of operation. At the time of reporting, approximately 150 Syrian armed forces personnel were in the position at Tal al-Kurum, the majority of them in the immediate vicinity of the observation post towards the bottom of the hill, while a small number continued to come close to the top of the hill and the post to observe opposition-held areas.

25. On several occasions, tank and artillery rounds, small arms and machine gun fire landed close to and inside United Nations positions. On 18 and 25 June, tank rounds landed close to United Nations position 69, and on 12 July an artillery round impacted close to the position. On 13 June, a stray bullet hit observation post 52. On 25 June, small arms fire landed inside position 68, causing damage to the water tank, and on 29 July a stray bullet landed near the position. In the context of the ongoing fighting between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition and other armed groups in the area of Al-Qahtaniyah, United Nations personnel at observation post 51 frequently observed multiple rounds of machine gun fire and occasionally anti-aircraft fire landing west of the ceasefire line and on numerous occasions in close proximity to the observation post. On 31 May, gunshots hit the observation post, causing slight damage to the building and an armoured vehicle. On 4 July, two tank rounds landed close to the observation post. On a few occasions, small arms fire coming from Al-Qahtaniyah was directed at the observation post, seemingly to deter United Nations personnel from observing the area. Mortar rounds landed in the vicinity of and one inside position 27 on 31 May. On 4 June, two stray bullets were discovered in Camp Ziouani, one of which had penetrated an UNDOF vehicle, causing damage to the windshield and the rear seats. On several occasions, UNDOF personnel at position 60 observed firing in close proximity to the position.

26. There were also incidents involving UNDOF patrols. On 5 July, a routine UNDOF two-vehicle patrol moving from position 80 to position 69 came under fire shortly before reaching position 69, where it had stopped in order to check one vehicle. One motorcycle and one pick-up truck approached from the opposite direction and were about to pass the United Nations patrol when one tank round landed close to the truck, with shrapnel injuring two UNDOF personnel and damaging a United Nations truck. The wounded UNDOF personnel immediately were medically evacuated to the Alpha side and were released from hospital the following day. UNDOF assessed that the tank round was fired from the area of Kammuniyah, an area generally dominated by the Syrian armed forces, in the area of limitation. Owing to the security situation in the vicinity of the incident, UNDOF could not recover the damaged vehicle. UNDOF observed that the vehicle was looted following the incident on 5 July, and was taken away by unidentified individuals during the night of 9-10 July. On 7 July, in the vicinity of Ruihinah village, in proximity to United Nations position 68, a seven-vehicle UNDOF convoy was fired upon with anti-aircraft rounds. There were no injuries to United Nations personnel. One of the United Nations vehicles sustained damage. The convoy was able to return to position 68. UNDOF assessed the fire to have originated from the

area of limitation at Zbedah al-Sharkia, an area generally dominated by the Syrian armed forces. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate denied any Syrian armed forces involvement in either of the two incidents. In the northern part of the area of limitation, owing to the presence of armed opposition groups in Bayt Jinn and Mazra'at Bayt Jinn and increased fighting between Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition, UNDOF continued to re-route its movements to Mount Hermon positions, doubling the travel time in each direction.

27. Throughout the reporting period, the Syrian armed forces maintained a larger number of soldiers and increased their heavy equipment inside the area of separation. They significantly increased their presence, in particular south of the main road between Quneitra in the west and Kahn Arnabeh in the east, and continued to maintain checkpoints inside the area of separation, mainly along the main road. In addition, in some areas Syrian armed forces personnel maintained checkpoints at the eastern entrances to the area of separation, straddling the Bravo line, to control and restrict traffic. Armed opposition groups and other armed groups remained dominant in significant parts of the southern area of separation, maintaining checkpoints and restricting movement in some areas. For most of the reporting period, the Syrian armed forces maintained up to six tanks in the area of separation. UNDOF observed one tank controlled by armed groups moving between the areas of separation and the limitation in the vicinity of Ruihinah, Bir Ajam and Braika. Shortly before fighting broke out in the Quneitra area at the end of August, UNDOF observed some 10 tanks under the control of the Syrian armed forces that were deployed either in the area of separation or in areas immediately adjacent to it. At the same time, UNDOF observed four tanks in the area between Zbedah al-Gharbia and Braika under the control of armed opposition elements. Checkpoints often interfered with the freedom of movement of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan. Restrictions on the movement of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan in the areas of separation and limitation have increased as a result of continuing clashes between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition and other armed groups, disrupting the supply lines to UNDOF positions in the southern part of the area of separation. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate advised UNDOF that, for security reasons, all United Nations personnel should avoid areas where clashes were ongoing and that UNDOF should not carry out movements at night.

28. The restrictions of movement and risk to United Nations personnel, owing to the placement of improvised explosive devices alongside roads in the area of separation by armed members of the opposition, remained high. Until the evacuation of the positions at the end of August, UNDOF continued to observe the presence of improvised explosive devices and roadblocks in the vicinity of or on access roads to United Nations positions 27, 60 and 68 and United Nations observation posts 51 and 56 and outpost 32A.

29. UNDOF protested the presence of Syrian armed forces and equipment in the area of separation, the firing into and inside the area of separation and the firing towards United Nations personnel and facilities. The Force Commander reiterated to the Syrian authorities the obligation of the armed forces to halt military operations in the area of separation and to cease firing from the area of limitation, stressing the importance of abiding by the terms of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground. Senior United Nations officials have conveyed similar messages to the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations.

30. Within this challenging operational environment, and with a view to ensuring its ability to implement its mandate safely and securely, UNDOF supervised the area of separation by manning static positions, conducting around-the-clock observation and conducting patrols along most of the ceasefire line to ensure no breaches of the ceasefire line occurred. In the northern part of the area of separation, UNDOF conducted vehicle patrols, as well as foot patrols on routes that are inaccessible to vehicles. In the southern part of the area of separation, until the events of late August, UNDOF conducted daily patrols to United Nations outposts 85A and 86B, with a view to observing developments in areas from which UNDOF temporarily withdrew its personnel in early 2013. The UNDOF operations continued to be supported by the Observer Group Golan military observers, whose focus of activities was shifted from patrolling and inspection to round-the-clock static observation, investigations and situation analysis. UNDOF, through Observer Group Golan, continues to establish temporary observation posts in several locations along the ceasefire line on the Alpha side several times a week, so as to increase the Force's situational awareness of the area of separation, in particular in the south, where United Nations positions and observation posts have been vacated temporarily owing to the security situation. Through the Observer Group Golan, UNDOF continued to carry out fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in the area of limitation on the Alpha side. On several occasions, Observer Group Golan observed several 155 mm artillery weapons deployed in the 10 km zone. Liaison officers from the Alpha side accompanied Observer Group Golan inspection teams. Inspections and mobile operations in the area of limitation on the Bravo side remained suspended because of the security situation. As in the past, the Force faced restrictions on freedom of movement and its inspection teams were denied access to some positions on the Alpha side. Observer Group Golan members continued to experience regular restrictions of movement on the Alpha side when entering and exiting United Nations observation posts 52 and 73, located to the east of the Israeli technical fence. IDF further reduced the number of technical fence crossings for the two observation posts from two to one per day, further limiting the ability of United Nations personnel to carry out vehicle patrols as well as access by contractors to perform enhancement works at the observation posts.

31. As detailed in paragraph 4, as a result of the fighting that erupted on 27 August, which led to the detention of United Nations personnel and the confinement of others in two United Nations positions, UNDOF was forced to leave position 27 and evacuated personnel from positions 60, 68, 69 and 85 as well as observation posts 52 and 56. UNDOF personnel deployed at the Charlie gate at the official crossing between the Alpha and Bravo sides evacuated their position in the early morning of 27 August, when fighting had erupted and was coming close to the area of the gates. Except for observation post 56, around which Syrian armed forces remain deployed, members of armed groups have been seen entering all vacated United Nations positions and looting United Nations equipment and personal items. They also took control of numerous United Nations armoured vehicles. The main effort continued to focus on static activities, combined with an emphasis enhanced situational analysis, reporting and liaising with the parties to prevent situations from escalating. Both parties maintained defensive positions in the respective areas of limitation. Israeli customs officials continued to operate periodically at the IDF post at the UNDOF crossing gate between the Israeli-occupied Golan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

32. In the vicinity of the ceasefire line in the area of separation, mines continued to pose a threat to UNDOF personnel and local inhabitants. Owing to the long-term presence of the mines and the deterioration of their detonation systems, the threat increases as each year passes. On 16 and 30 July, UNDOF observed an explosion at a location where a Syrian armed forces bulldozer was carrying out construction works in the vicinity of observation post 56. On each occasion, the driver was evacuated.

33. The limitations imposed by the security situation on the Bravo side notwithstanding, UNDOF continued its efforts to liaise with local authorities and engage with the local population to explain the mandate and activities of the Force. This remained important in the light of the security situation in the UNDOF area of operation and as part of the effort to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground.

34. On 8 July and 14 August, UNDOF, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, facilitated the crossing of 47 students from the Bravo side to the Alpha side and 33 students from the Alpha side to the Bravo side. UNDOF continued to provide emergency medical treatment to civilians on a strictly humanitarian basis. During periods of intensive fighting between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition and other armed groups, local inhabitants of areas under fire fled to safer areas in the area of separation and limitation. In late May, civilians from villages in the area of limitation that had come under aerial and artillery attacks fled to two villages in the area of separation in the vicinity of United Nations position 80. Their numbers increased in early June. UNDOF observed approximately 70 small and large tents in the area housing between 200 and 250 individuals. In addition, a total of 34 tents accommodating 170 persons have been set up since late May on the outskirts of al-Rafid village in the area of separation south of position 80. While the number of internally displaced persons in the camps is currently low, UNDOF has learned from persons in the camps that 15,000 individuals registered their names with the camps.

35. As at 2 September, UNDOF comprised 1,271 troops, including 48 women, from Fiji (445), the Philippines (344), India (191), Ireland (134), Nepal (155) and the Netherlands (2). In addition, 81 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, including one woman, assisted the Force in carrying out its tasks.

36. UNDOF continues to adopt and update mitigation measures on the basis of a comprehensive risk assessment carried out by the Force with the support of the Secretariat. During the reporting period, the UNDOF made further enhancements to a number of its vulnerable premises that could be affected by the fighting in the Syrian conflict. The enhancements included adding hardened watchtowers, reinforcing buildings against direct and indirect fire and strengthening perimeter walls and wire fencing. Other mitigation measures, including regular rehearsals of medical evacuations, shelter alerts and other emergency exercises, improved perimeter defence of the Force headquarters and all other positions, and the provision of personal protective equipment to all military and civilian personnel and the necessary training remain in place. The UNDOF counter-improvised explosive device equipment was inducted into the Force and has strengthened the capability of UNDOF to cope with the threat of improvised explosive devices. However, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic still has not allowed, despite its promises,

the delivery of the remaining counter-improvised explosive device equipment. The overall security situation has rendered it necessary for UNDOF to continue to use, with the cooperation of the relevant authorities, alternative ports of entry and departure for Force personnel.

37. All regular movements of UNDOF personnel on the Bravo side are controlled and continue to be carried out in formed convoys using armoured vehicles. Logistics movements are provided with armed escorts. UNDOF maintains regular armoured convoy movements between Damascus and Camp Faouar to allow all UNDOF national staff whose positions are based at UNDOF headquarters to report to work regularly. A number of national staff whose functions do not necessarily require their presence in Camp Faouar continue to work from the UNDOF office in Damascus, leaving only essential international staff to work in Camp Faouar. The offices of non-essential staff have been relocated to Camp Ziouani, which also serves as an alternate headquarters of the Force. Between 2 and 4 June, in accordance with advisories issued by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security in Damascus, UNDOF froze all movement between Camp Faouar and Damascus as a precautionary measure to prevent incidents in the context of the presidential elections. UNDOF also decided to suspend movement during the same period between the Alpha and Bravo sides. On 3 June, election day, UNDOF placed its reserves on standby in potentially sensitive locations and suspended all movements in the area of operations. Since 27 August, owing to the heavy fighting in the central part of the area of separation, during which control of the Bravo gate fell into the hands of armed groups, UNDOF has suspended movements on the main road between Camp Faouar on the Bravo side and Camp Ziouani on the Alpha side. Further adjustments to the Force's working arrangements will need to be considered if safe movement across the Alpha and Bravo gates cannot be re-established.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

38. The Security Council, when deciding in its resolution 2131 (2013) to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, until 30 June 2014, called upon the parties concerned to immediately implement its resolution 338 (1973) and requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of the period, a report on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, in particular the efforts made at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973), was dealt with in my report on the situation in the Middle East (A/69/341), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 68/16 on Jerusalem and 68/17 on the Syrian Golan.

39. Since the discontinuation of indirect peace talks in December 2008, there have been no negotiations between the parties. The Syrian conflict is further reducing the prospects for their resumption and progress towards peace between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. I look forward to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and the resumption of efforts towards a comprehensive, just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973) and other relevant resolutions.

IV. Observations

40. I note with deep concern the serious violations of the Disengagement Agreement that have taken place, which resulted, in one instance, in the tragic deaths of an Israeli teenager and Syrian armed forces soldiers, as well as injuries to persons on both sides. This is the result of a significant deterioration of the security situation in the UNDOF area of operation. The firing by Syrian forces across the ceasefire line as well as the Israeli responses with artillery fire and airstrikes jeopardize the maintenance of the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. It remains critical that both sides work through UNDOF to contain any incidents that occur along or across the ceasefire line. The mandate of UNDOF remains an important element in ensuring the stability of the region.

41. I strongly condemn the forced removal of United Nations personnel from their position and their detention by armed elements, and call for their immediate, unconditional and safe release. I also condemn the confinement of United Nations personnel within their premises under threat of physical violence. Any hostile act against United Nations personnel on the ground, including threatening their physical safety and restricting their movement, the direct and indirect firing at United Nations personnel and facilities and the use of United Nations premises, including those vacated temporarily, by anyone other than United Nations personnel, is unacceptable.

42. The activities of several armed elements, including the al-Nusra Front, in the UNDOF area of operation since late August, and the direct confrontations with United Nations personnel, forced UNDOF to vacate all but one of its positions in the southern area of separation, thereby significantly impacting its ability to carry out its mandate as agreed between the Governments of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic in the Disengagement of Forces Agreement of 1974.

43. Armed opposition groups and other armed groups have gained control of a large part of the area of separation, including a section of the main road connecting the two UNDOF camps and the crossing between the Alpha and the Bravo sides. It remains critical that countries with influence continue to strongly convey to the armed groups in the UNDOF area of operation the unacceptability of threatening and detaining United Nations peacekeepers and the need to cease any actions that jeopardize the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground, including firing at peacekeepers, and to accord United Nations personnel the freedom to carry out their mandate safely and securely. Threats by any person or organization against United Nations personnel are unacceptable.

44. The primary responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel in the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side rests with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. I note the assistance provided by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in facilitating the provision of essential supplies in support of the Force to ensure that it continues implementing its mandate safely and securely. It is imperative that respect for the privileges and immunities of UNDOF and its freedom of movement be ensured.

45. There have been numerous incidents involving United Nations personnel on the ground. I am also gravely concerned about United Nations positions caught in crossfire and repeatedly sustaining damage to their infrastructure. The placing of improvised explosive devices by armed groups, especially close to and on access

routes to United Nations positions, remains of great concern. It exposes United Nations peacekeepers on the ground to further risk. The safety and security of UNDOF personnel and Observer Group Golan military observers must be preserved. I remain deeply concerned about the continuing deterioration of the security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, its impact on the Syrian population and potential implications for the stability of the region. The ongoing military activities in the area of separation and incidents across the ceasefire line have led to periods of heightened tensions between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and increase the risk to United Nations personnel.

46. Severe and sustained engagements between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition and other armed groups in close proximity to United Nations personnel and positions are very worrying. The use of heavy weapons by both the Syrian armed forces and armed groups in the continuing Syrian conflict, including air power by Government forces in the area of limitation on the Bravo side, remains disturbing.

47. I am also concerned by the firing of a cluster ammunition round, which, had it exploded and released the sub-munitions, would have indiscriminately endangered the lives of the civilian population in the area, as well as that of United Nations peacekeepers, well beyond the instant it was fired. The use of such ammunition is contrary to the Convention on Cluster Munitions of 2008. There should be no military forces in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF. I note with concern the presence and use of tanks by Syrian armed forces and armed groups in the area of separation. I call upon all parties to the Syrian conflict to cease military actions throughout the country, including in the UNDOF area of operation. I call on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to stop the use of airstrikes, which cause suffering to the civilian population. I reiterate that all military activities in the area of separation conducted by any actor pose a risk to the ceasefire and to the local civilian population, in addition to the United Nations personnel on the ground.

48. The presence of the Syrian armed forces and unauthorized military equipment in the area of separation, in addition to the firing from the Bravo side across the ceasefire line, are grave violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. All incidents of firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line by either party are also grave violations of the Agreement. I stress the importance of all parties to liaise with UNDOF in the first instance to prevent any escalation of the situation. I call upon all parties to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and ensure respect for the safety and security of United Nations personnel, in addition to freedom of movement for UNDOF throughout its area of operation. For its part, the United Nations will spare no effort in ensuring that the long-held ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic continues to hold.

49. In view of the critical developments in the UNDOF area of operations, the Force immediately took further measures to adjust temporarily its posture and operations. In accordance with its mandate, UNDOF will continue to use its best efforts to monitor the ceasefire between Syrian and Israeli forces and see that it is observed, albeit in increasingly challenging and difficult circumstances. Given the rapidly evolving and volatile situation in the UNDOF area of operation, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in consultation with UNDOF, continues to review the Force's operational posture, configuration and activities.

50. The support of the parties and the Security Council is critical as UNDOF continues to adapt to the evolving situation. It is equally critical that the Council continue to bring its influence to bear on the parties concerned to ensure that UNDOF is accorded the ability to operate freely and securely within its area of operation and to carry out its important mandate. It is essential that UNDOF continue to have at its disposal all necessary means and resources, particularly in the light of the volatile security environment. UNDOF also needs to retain the confidence and commitment of troop-contributing countries. I am grateful to the Governments of Fiji, India, Ireland, Nepal, the Netherlands and the Philippines for their contributions to UNDOF and for staying the course under challenging circumstances. In addition, I am grateful to the Member States contributing military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. The continued credible presence of UNDOF remains an important element in ensuring stability on the Golan and in the region.

51. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Head of Mission and Force Commander, Lieutenant General Iqbal Singh Singha, and to the military and civilian personnel serving under his leadership, who continue to perform with efficiency and commitment, under extremely challenging circumstances, the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council. I have full confidence that UNDOF will continue to use its best efforts to carry out its mandate.

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Letter dated 10 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am writing to draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan recorded for the month of August 2014 (see annex).

The irresponsible, provocative actions of Azerbaijan, including intrusions of subversive groups and sniper shelling, during the reporting period resulted in the deaths of First Lieutenant Zorik Gevorkyan and soldiers Sarkis Movsisyan and Aram Grigoryan, killed on 2, 3 and 4 August, respectively, while soldiers Artur Nersisyan, Hovsep Arustamyan and Argishti Galoyan were wounded on 2 August and Viktor Abramov on 7 August.

Armenia strongly condemns these continued provocations and the meaningless use of force by Azerbaijan, and calls upon the latter to strictly observe the ceasefire regime.

I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-60951 (E) 250914

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Annex to the letter dated 10 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1-31 August 2014

1. On the borderline of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic:

   Total number of violations ~ 2301
   Total number of shots ~ 87831

   AK(AKM) ~56440, PK ~ 26435, SVD ~ 1387, DSHK ~ 305, RPK ~ 1440, Black arrow ~ 74, Istiglal ~ 774, RPG ~ 60, Utyos (NSVP/NSVT) ~ 898, 82-BM-37 ~ 13, F-1~ 5

2. On the borderline of the Republic of Armenia (see table below):

   Total number of violations ~ 477
   Total number of shots ~ 32143

   AK(AKM) ~ 2964, PK ~ 19930, SVD ~ 628, DSHK ~ 6655, RPK ~ 33, Black arrow ~ 246, Istiglal ~ 83, RPG/SPG ~ 40, Utyos (NSVP/NSVT) ~ 1015, AGS-17 ~ 46, 82-BM-37 ~ 8, ZSU-23~ 495

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
1.	1 August	Aygepar	0005	AK	2	
2.			0025	PK	9	
3.			0040	AK	2	
4.			0105	PK	6	
5.			0220		8	
6.		Dovegh	0005	RPG-7	1	
7.			0030	82 mm mortar	1	
8.			0550	RPG-7	7	
9.			2225	Black arrow	3	
10.			2350	DShK	15	
11.		Yanshak	0050	SVD	3	
12.		Earskh	0135	AK	1	

Abbreviations: AK (AKM), Kalashnikov rifle (7.62 mm/5.45); PK, Kalashnikov machine gun (7.62 mm); SVD, 7.62 mm sniper rifle; DShK, 12.7 mm machine gun; RPK, 5.45 mm machine gun; Black arrow, 12.7 mm sniper weapon; Istiglal, 14.5 mm machine gun; RPG/SPG, anti-tank grenade launcher; Utyos (NSVP, NSVT), 12.7 mm machine gun; KPVT, 14.5 mm heavy machine gun; AGS-17, 30 mm automatic grenade launcher; ZSU-23, 23 mm anti-aircraft self-propelled mount; F-1, hand grenade; 82-BM-37, 82 mm mortar.

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
13.		Movses	0220	AK	5	
14.		Vazashen	0240	AKM	20	
15.			1645	SVD	3	
16.			1900	AKM	20	
17.			2000	Black arrow	7	
18.		Barekamavan	0300	SVD	2	
19.				Black arrow	2	
20.			0550	SPG-9	1	
21.			0610	RPG-7	6	
22.			0610	NSVP	80	
23.			1920	Black arrow	1	
24.				PK	2	
25.		Berqaber	0305	PK	7	
26.			0450	DShK	16	
27.			0520	DShK	90	
28.				RPG-7	3	
29.				ZSU-23	25	
30.			0540	DShK	450	
31.				PK	850	
32.			0540	ZSU-23	200	
33.			0700	ZSU-23	100	
34.				KPVT	700	
35.				PK	2500	
36.			0710	RPG-7	1	
37.			0720	RPG-7	3	
38.			2145	SVD	1	
39.			2155	AK	3	
40.			2225	PK	10	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
41.		Chinari	0750	Black arrow	1	
42.			1605		5	
43.			2140	Black arrow	2	
44.				DShK	2	
45.		Khndzorut	1640	AKM	1	
46.		Mehrab	1740	SVD	20	
47.				PK	30	
48.		Kutakan	1930	SVD	3	
49.		Gyuney	1950	SVD	4	
50.		Chambarak	2145	PK	30	
51.		Daranak	2315	Istiglal	20	
52.		Voskepar	2045	AK	8	
53.		Berdavan	2120	SVD	1	
54.			2225	PK	3	
55.				AK	12	
56.				SVD	10	
57.			2350	SVD	3	
58.				AKM	10	
59.	2 August	N. Karmiraghbyur	0010	SVD	2	At 0250 the diversion intelligence group from the Azerbaijani side near the village Nemerli approached combat position. First Lieutenant Zorik Gevorkyan was fatally wounded by the Azerbaijani diversion group. The following soldiers received various shrapnel wounds: 1. Sarkis Movsisyan (died in hospital on 3 August 2014)
60.			0045	PK	2	
61.			0130		20	
62.		Vazashen	0020	AK	1	
63.			0040	AK	5	
64.				PK	11	
65.			0120	PK	3	
66.			0800	AK	2	
67.			1410-1420	DShK	29	
68.			1710	AK	6	
69.			1845		6	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
70.		Berqaber	0040	PK	11	2. Artur Nersisyan
71.			1010	DShK	40	3. Hovsep Arustamyan
72.			1130	ZSU-23-2	50	4. Argishti Galoyan
73.			2125	PK	10	
74.				DShK	30	
75.				Black arrow	4	
76.			2315	PK	30	
77.		Paravaqar	0045	PK	30	
78.			1400	AK	20	
79.			1820		4	
80.			2200	PK	15	
81.			2230	AK	15	
82.		Chinari	0300	AK	5	
83.			0720	Black arrow	3	
84.		Aygepar	0120	PK	2	
85.			0415	PK	60	
86.			0435	AK	4	
87.			2155-2230	PK	25	
88.			2355		3	
89.		Movses	0200	PK	15	
90			0630	AK	1	
91.		Baghanis	0630	82 mm mortar	7	
92.		Voskepar	0950	Utyos	4	
93.		Berdavan	1110	PK	200	
94.			2210	DShK	3	
95.				AK	8	
96.		Chambarak	1310	Black arrow	5	
97.			1355	DShK	10	
98.			1900	DShK	15	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
99.				PK	25	
100.		Barcruni	1510	RPK	4	
101.			2220		1	
102.			2335	AK	7	
103.		Koti	1520	AK	5	
104.		Daranak	2040	NSVP	3	
105.				AK	10	
106.		Aygedzor	2130-2150	RPG-7	3	
107.				Black arrow	50	
108.				SVD	40	
109.				PK	300	
110.				AK	1 500	
111.		Gyunashli	2240	Istiglal	7	
112.		Eraskh	2250	RPK	5	
113.	3 August	N. Karmiraghbyur	0000	AK	6	
114.			0335	PK	8	
115.		Berdavan	0015	PK	5	
116.				SVD	1	
117.			0120	DShK	65	
118.				PK	55	
119.			0215	PK	10	
120.				AK	10	
121.		Dovegh	0015	Utyos	10	
122.		Paravaqar	0020	AK	2	
123.			0300		2	
124.			0450		60	
125.		Sevakavan	0045	AK	6	
126.		Gyunashli	0105	PK	5	
127.			0200		30	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
128.		Vazashen	0320	AK	10	
129.		Aygepar	0425	PK	15	
130.	4 August	Jil	0010	AK	15	At 1600 near the village Babashlar at the borderline in the combat position, soldier Aram Gri oryan was fatally wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
131.			0045	Black arrow	3	
132.			2330		3	
133.		Shishkaya	0045	Black arrow	6	
134.		Movses	0930	SVD	7	
135.			1945	Black arrow	5	
136.		Khndzorut	1015	AK	1	
137.			1020		4	
138.			1045		2	
139.			1506		1	
140.			1518		2	
141.		Aygepar	1445		22	
142.		Dovegh	1540	SVD	10	
143.		Babashlar	1600	Black arrow	1	
144.		Shavarshavan	1655	AK	6	
145.			1935	AKM	1	
146.		Berdavan	1748	SVD	6	
147.				AK	15	
148.		Kayanavan	1935	Black arrow	2	
149.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1945	SVD	5	
150.			2005	SVD	5	
151.		Paravaqar	1945	PK	15	
152.			1945	SVD	2	
153.		Baghanis	2020	Utyos	25	
154.		Dovegh	2030	PK	10	
155.		Vazashen	2015	AK	5	
156.			2100	PK	30	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
157.				AK	10	
158.		Chinari	2100	AK	20	
159.		Vahravar	2125	AK	15	
160.		Pambak	2235	Black arrow	10	
161.				PK	30	
162.		Dara	2330	Black arrow	5	
163.		Chambarak	2335		6	
164.	5 August	Chinari	0030	AK	1	
165.				Black arrow	5	
166.			0155	SVD	2	
167.			0430	AK	2	
168.			1120	Black arrow	3	
169.			1520	Black arrow	3	
170.			2305	DShK	4	
171.				PK	30	
172.		Aygepar	0210	AK	4	
173.			2250-0100	DShK	100	
174.				PK	800	
175.		Berdavan	0210	PK	118	
176.			0255	PK	20	
177.				AK	30	
178.		Paravaqar	0405	AK	20	
179.			0512	PK	50	
180.			1535	AK	10	
181.			1905	PK	10	
182.			2030	PK	14	
183.				DShK	10	
184.			2030	PK	5	
185.				DShK	10	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
186.			2240	AGS-17	7	
187.			2250	PK	600	
188.		N. Karmiraghbyur	0455	PK	13	
189.			2055		25	
190.			2125		25	
191.			2125	DShK	15	
192.			2230		10	
193.			2250-0100		500	
194.		Shishkaya	1155	Black arrow	3	
195.				PK	30	
196.			2215	Istiglal	5	
197.			1845		6	
198.		Vazashen	1200	DShK	6	
199.			1320	Black arrow	2	
200.			2205	AK	3	
201.			2205	PK	2	
202.			2300	DShK	11	
203.			2315		11	
204.			2315	AK	2	
205.		Berqaber	1700	SVD	5	
206.			2300	ZSU-23	20	
207.		Yanshak	1930	Black arrow	4	
208.		Khndzorut	1950	AK	5	
209.			2025		5	
210.		Chambarak	2000	DShK	10	
211.		Kayanavan	2045		15	
212.		Aygehovit	2110	DShK	4	
213.				PK	14	
214.		Dovegh	2130	AKØ	30	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
215.		Movses	2250-0100	DShK	150	
216.				PK	250	
217.		Koti	2300	ZSU-23	100	
218.		Aygedzor	2305	Black arrow	15	
219.	6 August	Koti	0000-0200	DShK	1 000	
220.				PK	2 400	
221.				SVD	200	
222.		Khndzorut	0005	AK	2	
223.		Vazashen	0005	RPG-7	1	
224.			2020	PK	35	
225.		Berdavan	0010	PK	60	
226.				SVD	40	
227.			2215	RPK	2	
228.			2355	PK	10	
229.				SVD	10	
230.		Berqaber	0020	DShK	400	
231.			0747	DShK	40	
232.		Karchevan	0020	AK	4	
233.		Vahravar	0040	PK	30	
234.				DShK	30	
235.				AKØ	60	
236.		Paravaqar	0050	AGS-17	5	
237.			2240	PK	10	
238.			2320	Black arrow	10	
239.		Eraskh	0120	AK	10	
240.		Baghanis	0530	AK	15	
241.			2040	Utyos	3	
242.		N. Karmiraghbyur	0930	SVD	1	
243.		Yanshak	1100	SVD	6	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
244.			1230	Black arrow	3	
245.		Movses	1635	Black arrow	4	
246.		Shishkaya	1645	Istiglal	1	
247.		Chambarak	1830	DShK	15	
248.				PK	20	
249.		Chinari	1930	SVD	1	
250.			2000		2	
251.			2035		2	
252.		Kayanavan	1945	PK	75	
253.			2030	PK	100	
254.				DShK	50	
255.		Agarak	2240	AK	2	
256.				PK	19	
257.		Dovegh	2355	PK	10	
258.				SVD	10	
259.	7 August	Yanshak	0000	Black arrow	4	At 0145 near the village Taghibeyli at the borderline in the combat position, soldier Viktor Abramov was wounded by the Azerbaijani side.
260.			2235	SVD	6	
261.			0430	PK	6	
262.		Aygepar	0010	AK	1	
263.			0400		2	
264.			1045		8	
265.		Vazashen	0040	RPG-7	1	
266.			0225-0256	AK	27	
267.				PK	40	
268.			2300	AK	10	
269.		Voskepar	0105	PK	8	
270.			2300-2400		3 560	
271.		Chinari	0330	SVD	1	
272.			0930		1	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
273.			1205	AK	70	
274.				PK	50	
275.			1305	RPG-7	2	
276.			1830	AK	9	
277.			1830	Black arrow	5	
278.		Movses	1420	Black arrow	6	
279.			2040		1	
280.		Chambarak	1900	DShK	6	
281.		Shishkaya	1905	Istiglal	3	
282.			2015		15	
283.		Martiros	2010	AK	5	
284.			2035		10	
285.		Kayanavan	2300	PK	35	
286.		Khndzorut	2325	AK	3	
287.		Vahan	2335	PK	10	
288.		Baghanis	2335	NSVP	20	
289.				KPVT	10	
290.	8 August	Paravaqar	0005	PK	100	
291.		Aygepar	0040	AK	3	
292.			0330		2	
293.			0345		3	
294.			0425	SVD	7	
295.		Aygedzor	0120	PK	10	
296.		Movses	0200	AK	2	
297.			0300	PK	3	
298.			0355	AK	2	
299.		Yanshak	1200	DShK	300	
300.				PK	500	
301.			1640	SVD	4	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
302.			2115		3	
303.		Chinari	1240	DShK	8	
304.			2205	DShK	25	
305.		Chambarak	1245	DShK	2	
306.			2130	PK	15	
307.		Barcruni	1300	AK	20	
308.		Martiros	1600	AK	50	
309.		Chopurlu	1810	Black arrow	8	
310.		Shishkaya	1950	Istiglal	1	
311.				PK	8	
312.		N. Karmiraghbyur	2025	RPG-7	1	
313.			2045	RPG-7	1	
314.		Sevakavan	2055	AK	4	
315.		Baghanis	2345-0025	NSVP	100	
316.				PK	400	
317.	9 August	Eraskh	0115	AK	4	
318.			2215		2	
319.		Movses	0143	PK	5	
320.			0220-0430	DShK	700	
321.				PK	1000	
322.			1145	AK	2	
323.			2140	PK	6	
324.		Aygedzor	0143	PK	5	
325.		Berqaber	0200	SVD	6	
326.			0240	AK	4	
327.		Aygepar	0710	SVD	4	
328.		Vazashen	1030	PK	3	
329.			1150	AK	10	
330.		Yanshak	1745	PK	25	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
331.		Chambarak	1715	PK	20	
332.			2215		50	
333.		Khndzorut	1840	SVD	2	
334.		Baghanis	1942	AK	4	
335.	10 August	Vazashen	0040	PK	30	
336.			0045		20	
337.			0050	AGS-17	32	
338.				PK	40	
339.			0055	PK	20	
340.			0105	DShK	50	
341.				PK	20	
342.			0115	PK	60	
343.			0120	AK	30	
344.			0415	PK	50	
345.			1930	Istiglal	3	
346.			2130	AK	5	
347.				SVD	6	
348.			2345	AK	3	
349.		Aygehovit	0115	PK	25	
350.		Paravaqar	0140	PK	100	
351.			0300	AGS-17	2	
352.			2120	DShK	3	
353.			2305	PK	50	
354.		Aygepar	0210	DShK	10	
355.			0220-0430	DShK	2 000	
356.				PK	3 000	
357.			0810	DShK	2	
358.			2030	SVD	2	
359.		Berqaber	0210	DShK	15	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
360.			0330		15	
361.			0347		10	
362.			1050		10	
363.			2040	SVD	15	
364.		Koti	0315	DShK	60	
365.				PK	200	
366.		N. Karmiraghbyur	0330	RPG-7	2	
367.			0430		3	
368.		Voskevan	0337	DShK	50	
369.				PK	600	
370.			0607	Utyos	60	
371.		Voskepar	0350	DShK	30	
372.			0518		95	
373.			1050	Black arrow	20	
374.			1050	DShK	4	
375.			1325	SPG-9	4	
376.		Verdavan	1530	SVD	1	
377.			2330	PK	15	
378.		Baghanis	0835	AK	15	
379.		Yanshak	1220	DShK	40	
380.				PK	70	
381.				AK	90	
382.		Movses	1950	DShK	6	
383.			1950		1	
384.		Ajibaj	2000	SVD	4	
385.				PK	36	
386.		Lev	2045	Black arrow	11	
387.				DShK	25	
388.				SVD	15	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
389.		Sevakavan	2230	AK	2	
390.	11 August	Paravaqar	0010	PK	25	
391.			1040	Black arrow	1	
392.		Eraskh	0035	AK	1	
393.			0154		1	
394.			0220		2	
395.			0250	RPK	2	
396.		Berdavan	0120	PK	20	
397.				AK	15	
398.			0145	PK	10	
399.		Movses	0550	SVD	2	
400.			1120		1	
401.		Chinari	1105	Black arrow	6	
402.		Martiros	1115	AK	1	
403.		Aygedzor	1620	SVD	12	
404.				AK	6	
405.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1820	PK	20	
406.			1920	PK	10	
407.				SVD	18	
408.			2030	PK	15	
409.				AK	15	
410.		Aygepar	2230	SVD	2	
411.	12 August	Eraskh	0240	RPK	1	
412.		Ajibaj	1350	AK	20	
413.		Paravaqar	1410		9	
414.		Movses	1830	SVD	3	
415.		Shishkaya	2030	DShK	3	
416.		Koti	2150	AK	6	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
417.	13 August	N. Karmiraghbyur	1020	AK	1	
418.		Kutakan	1605		10	
419.		Jil	1605	PK	6	
420.		Ajibaj	1910	PK	15	
421.		Movses	2315	SVD	1	
422.		Vazashen	2325	AK	15	
423.	14 August	Chinari	0005	SVD	4	
424.		Vazashen	0030	Istiglal	15	
425.		Movses	0100	AKM	1	
426.		Paravaqar	1320	AK	5	
427.	15 August	Gyunashli	0945	PK	60	
428.		Chinari	1420	Black arrow	1	
429.		Ajibaj	2150	RPK	15	
430.		Voskepar	2220	AK	3	
431.	16 August	Ajibaj	0000	AK	3	
432.			2000	PK	30	
433.		Sevakavan	1330	AK	2	
434.		Chinari	1620		2	
435.		Movses	1800	SVD	3	
436.	17 August	Aygedzor	0020	PK	7	
437.		Khachik	0035	AK	1	
438.			2045		10	
439.		Azatamut	0040		5	
440.		Ajibaj	1135		5	
441.		Aygedzor	1510		11	
442.		Barekamavan	2230		35	
443.		Voskepar	2310		3	
444.		Koti	2340		3	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
445.	18 August	Vazashen	0005	AK	7	
446.		Koti	0015		1	
447.		Chinari	1250	RPK	3	
448.		Mehrab	1925	SVD	6	
449.		Khachik	1615	AK	2	
450.	19 August	Ajibaj	0000	PK	30	
451.		Paravaqar	0210	AK	3	
452.		Barcruni	0925		6	
453.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1150	AK	2	
454.				SVD	2	
455.		Mehrab	1720	SVD	19	
456.		Khachik	1952	AK	2	
457.		Voskepar	2300		4	
458.		Eraskh	2350		7	
459.	20 August	Berqaber	0010	AK	6	
460.		Shavarshavan	0020		6	
461.			0105		20	
462.			0125	SVD	3	
463.		Baghanis	0125	PK	3	
464.				SVD	1	
465.		Eraskh	0310	AK	5	
466.		Mehrab	1350		10	
467.		Sevakavan	1745		3	
468.		Khachik	2221		3	
469.		Vazashen	2355		5	
470.	21 August	Babashlar	1410	Istiglal	6	
471.		Eraskh	1625	AK	1	
472.			1940		2	
473.		Baghanis	1635	AK	5	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
474.			1810	AK	7	
475.				Black arrow	2	
476.		Paravaqar	1955	AK	15	
477.			1955	SVD	2	
478.	22 August	Eraskh	0110	AK	3	
479.			0550		4	
480.			1500		2	
481.			1710		1	
482.			2105		1	
483.		Paravaqar	2320		2	
484.		Sarigyugh	1935		2	
485.	23 August	Koti	0250	AK	3	
486.				PK	20	
487.		Geghamasar	1825	SVD	3	
488.				Istiglal	1	
489.		Movses	1615	AKM	5	
490.	24 August	Vazashen	1307	AK	2	
491.			1730	SVD	4	
492.			1850	Black arrow	4	
493.			2150	AK	2	
494.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1335	SVD	8	
495.		Movses	1825	PK	6	
496.		Choporlu	1955	SVD	10	
497.		Vahan	2100	PK	65	
498.		Kayanavan	2310	AK	16	
499.	25 August	Agarak	1255	AK	1	
500.		Vazashen	2045	PK	10	
501.	26 August	Baghanis	0015	AK	3	
502.		Dovegh	0900	PK	30	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
503.		Vazashen	1450	AK	1	
504.			2345		2	
505.		Eraskh	1525		1	
506.			2120		1	
507.		Agarak	1650		1	
508.		Voskepar	1730		15	
509.	27 August	Barekamavan	0250-0310	PK	30	
510.				AK	30	
511.		Shavarshavan	1820	SVD	2	
512.		Eraskh	2345	AK	1	
513.	28 August	Eraskh	0015	AK	3	
514.		Vazashen	1935	SVD	15	
515.		Agarak	2155	AK	2	
516.	29 August	Vazashen	1415	PK	3	
517.			1950	SVD	3	
518.			2340	AK	13	
519.	30 August	Choporlu	0715	Black arrow	5	
520.				DShK	20	
521.			2145	PK	10	
522.		Azatamut	0800	DShK	5	
523.		Mehrab	1015	SVD	2	
524.		Chambarak	1920	PK	3	
525.				SVD	2	
526.		Berqaber	2100	SVD	3	
527.			2230		4	
528.		Eraskh	2340	AK	2	
529.	31 August	Vazashen	0110	SVD	5	
530.			0425		6	
531.			2135	AK	1	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
532.		Sofulu	1320	PK	10	
533.		Movses	1735	AK	6	
534.		Paravaqar	1905		5	
535.			1920		15	

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Identical letters dated 15 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to set out the position of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) over the period from 29 May to 3 September 2014 (S/2014/665):

- The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that it is committed to its obligations under the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and has accordingly respected the mandate of UNDOF and facilitated its work in every way. For over four decades, for as long as Israel has occupied the Syrian Golan, the Government has cooperated and coordinated closely and fully with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDOF command. The Government stresses that the occupied Syrian Golan is an integral part of the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.

- Israel, on the other hand, has persisted in its repeated violations of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions, as is documented in the Secretary-General's most recent report. United Nations forces have also been victims of Israel's violations. According to paragraph 13 of the report, Israel carried out an attack on 2 June 2014, firing several rockets that landed near the United Nations command at the Nab' al-Fawar military camp, causing fear and terror among all United Nations force members. Not satisfied with this aggression, Israel attacked again on 23 June 2014. Paragraph 14 of the report states that several rockets landed in the area of the Nab' al-Fawar camp, killing nine Syrians and injuring nine others. In addition to those acts of aggression, Israel has directly supported armed terrorist groups. Paragraph 17 of the report states, verbatim, that UNDOF frequently observed armed members of the opposition interacting with the Israeli Defense Forces across the ceasefire line in the vicinity of United Nations position 85. By providing logistical and intelligence support for armed terrorists from the Nusrah Front and other terrorist groups, Israel has not only violated the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, but also jeopardized regional peace and security as well as the lives of United Nations personnel, as recent events have demonstrated.

- Mindful of its obligations, Syria has exercised the utmost restraint in responding to the activities of armed terrorist groups in the UNDOF area of operation. It understands the nature of the region and the obligations that are in force. It reiterates that the actions of Syrian law enforcement forces are a response to an emergency situation arising from exceptional circumstances, namely the terrorist activities of terrorist groups in the area of separation.

- The actions of Syrian law enforcement forces in the area of separation are the very least that the Syrian Government can do in response to appeals from the local population. The latter has borne the brunt of the terrorists' operations, which have also been directed against the United Nations force. These operations have been conducted with the direct assistance of the Israeli occupation forces, as well as the intelligence services of Arab States and States of the region and beyond, the identities of which are well known to all.

- The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic strongly condemned the recent abduction of UNDOF peacekeepers by armed terrorist groups including the Nusrah Front, which is included in the Security Council's counter-terrorism list. It has demanded the immediate release of the peacekeepers and held the armed terrorist groups and their backers responsible for their safety. Syria has spared no effort to ensure the safety and security of United Nations forces and personnel in the occupied Syrian Golan.

- We wish to make it clear that what is now happening in the area of separation is the inevitable result of two factors. First, the United Nations has ignored the reliable intelligence provided regularly by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the risk posed by the widespread presence of armed terrorist groups in the area of separation. Second, the United Nations has turned a blind eye to the direct support that the groups receive from Israel and certain other States.

- By failing to react, the United Nations has encouraged the groups to persist in their acts of terrorism. Most recently, the Nusrah Front abducted peacekeepers from the Fijian contingent, surrounded personnel from the Filipino contingent and threatened to kill them if their demands were not met. We would have expected the Secretariat, like the authorities of the Philippines, to thank the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic for its efforts, which led to the release of the Filipino peacekeepers, instead of deploring the presence of Syrian law enforcement forces, whose military operations ensured that the peacekeepers' lives were not jeopardized.

- Members of the Filipino contingent have been abducted on two occasions. The first incident occurred almost a year ago; the second was the recent incident involving troops from the Filipino and Fijian contingents. Both incidents took place in collusion with Qatar. The United Nations and the international community are aware of that country's ties to the terrorist Nusrah Front organization, which it funds and arms. The Syrian Government stresses that the abduction of UNDOF peacekeepers is an unforgivable crime. However, the Nusrah Front criminals would have not taken such action were it not for the direct encouragement of Qatar and its readiness to pay millions of dollars under the pretext of obtaining the peacekeepers' release. That action constitutes financing of terrorism and a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 2170 (2014) on counter-terrorism and combating

the financing of terrorism. It also contravenes Security Council resolution 2133 (2014), which prohibits the payment of ransom to terrorists.

- Syria calls on the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, to put an end to the actions of Qatar and other States that violate international law and the relevant Security Council resolutions. The United Nations must avoid a repeat of the situation that arose around a year ago, when it did absolutely nothing to investigate the intelligence that we provided to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations regarding the involvement of the Qatari intelligence services in the abduction of peacekeepers from the Filipino contingent. Syria also calls on the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, to take immediate action against the parties and States that sponsor and control the armed terrorist groups. To continue overlooking the threat posed by the presence and activity of those terrorist groups in the area of separation would exacerbate the area's instability and endanger the safety and security of United Nations staff.

- Syria is dismayed that, in its report, the Secretariat systematically ignores the terrorist nature of the groups designated as such by the Security Council, including the Nusrah Front and Ahrar Al-Sham Front, also known as the Islamic Front, which are part of Al-Qaida and have committed barbaric acts of terrorism not only against UNDOF but also against the Syrian people and the Syrian State and its institutions and infrastructure. One example can be found in paragraph 42 of the report, in which it is stated that the activities of several armed elements, including the Nusrah Front, in the UNDOF area of operation since late August, and the direct confrontations with United Nations personnel, forced UNDOF to vacate all but one of its positions. By persisting in describing those terrorist groups as "armed resistance", "armed resistance groups" or groups of "insurgents", the Secretariat has contradicted the statement issued on 28 August 2014 by the Security Council on the abduction of UNDOF forces by "Security Council-designated terrorist groups". It has also committed a grave violation of Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 2170 (2014).

- The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is dismayed that UNDOF took the American journalist Peter Theo Curtis, who had been held hostage by the Nusrah Front, across the line of separation into occupied territory without coordinating its actions with the Syrian Government. The illicit smuggling of a person outside Syrian territory constitutes a violation of the UNDOF mandate and of Syrian sovereignty. Moreover, by communicating with the Nusrah Front, which the Security Council has placed on its counter-terrorism list, UNDOF has also contravened the Organization's counter-terrorism resolutions, the most recent of which is Security Council resolution 2170 (2014). The report appears to have deliberately overlooked the matter in order to avoid causing embarrassment at such illegal behaviour.

- In the conclusion of his report, the Secretary-General states that UNDOF continues to adapt to the evolving situation. He calls on the Security Council to continue to bring its influence to bear on the parties concerned to ensure that UNDOF is accorded the ability to operate freely and securely within its area of operation. At the same time, however, the report states that the Force will take further measures to adjust its posture and operations along the

ceasefire line, something that it has effectively begun to do by withdrawing from its current positions and strengthening its positions along the ceasefire line on the Alpha side. This would indicate that the activities of UNDOF will take place outside the area of separation, creating a void that the armed terrorist groups will exploit in order to create chaos and turmoil in the area at the behest of their supporters, thereby endangering peace and security in the region.

- The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic notes that UNDOF command moved its headquarters in contravention of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, although it could have performed its role fully from its Damascus headquarters. In that connection, it should be noted that the Syrian Arab Republic Government has spared no effort to support the Force and its operations, including by allowing the delivery of Irish supplies and equipment designed to detect improvised explosive devices and by facilitating the delivery of sophisticated equipment to all UNDOF contingents.

- The Syrian Government stresses that UNDOF must continue to fulfil its mandate within the context of Security Council resolutions and the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Syria undertakes to continue supporting UNDOF as it has done over the years, taking into account the points made above.

- Syria again emphasizes the need to address the fundamental reason for the presence of UNDOF, namely the continuing Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan. It reiterates its call on the Security Council to enforce its resolutions in that regard, particularly resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 491 (1981), which reject the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan and require Israel to withdraw from all occupied Arab territories, including the occupied Syrian Golan, to the line of 4 June 1967.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations